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Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW PROTECTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment presents an overview of the Pennsylvania Peer
Review Protection Act' and an outline of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania's case law interpreting the Act.
The medical profession has been actively regulated for over a
century. 2 Today, the peer review organization is the primary form
by which hospitals exercise self-regulation. 3 In order for a hospital
to be eligible for federal Medicare and Medicaid programs it must
exercise internal peer review. 4 Federal standards for peer review are
established by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals
(the "JCAH").' Once a hospital gains JCAH accreditation, it au-
tomatically qualifies for federal Medicare reimbursements. 6 Peer re-
view, however, is not merely a means by which a hospital obtains
funding. In fact, the primary purpose of peer review is to improve
the quality of care and services rendered by the health care facility.7
Through this policy of self-assessment all health care professionals
ought to be striving toward self-improvement.'
1. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.1 et seq. (Purdon 1986).
2. For a thorough analysis of the history of medical regulation in Pennsyl-
vania, see Comment, Pennsylvania Law of Hospital Supervision: Its Origin and
Present Meaning, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 187 (1978).
3. For a discussion of peer review form and policy, see Comment, Medical
Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552 (1979).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-96 (1987).
5. The JCAH is a private organization founded by the American College
of Physicians, the American Hospital Association, and the American Medical
Association. The constitutionality of such a delegation of power from the federal
government to a private organization is not a subject developed in this Comment.
6. Social Security Act, Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395(b)(a)(1)(1987).
7. See Comment, Peer Review Protection: The Pennsylvania Approach at
the Crossroads, 91 DICK. L. REv. 329 (Fall 1986), (citing the JCAH Manual)
[hereinafter Peer Review Protection].
8. E.K. Huffman, Medical Record Management, Revised by the American
Medical Record Association, B.C. Campbell, RRA Editor, Physician's Record
Company, 533 (1981).
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The Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act 9 (the "PPRPA")
mandates that the "proceedings and records of a review committee
shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any
civil action." 10 It is with the above language that much of the present
controversy arises involving the PPRPA. When do the statutory
exceptions to the general rule come into play? Is the confidentiality
of such proceedings necessary in order to maintain open and frank
discussion in physician care review? Does open and frank review
actually occur? Does this confidentiality merely perpetuate a "con-
spiracy of silence" among physicians? The assurance of confidenti-
ality of peer review records can serve as a sword to stimulate more
diligent review, while at the same time it may serve as a shield or a
barrier to the disclosure of ineffective peer review and/or incompetent
medical care." This comment will analyze the Pennsylvania statute,
the case law interpreting the statute, and the public policy arguments
contained therein and will attempt to give effective answers to the
issues that will effect the future of medical care.
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA PEER REVIEW PROTECTION ACT
The Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act12 was enacted
in 1974.13 The Act was later amended in part in
9. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.1 et seq. (Purdon 1986).
10. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.4 (Purdon 1986), states:
Confidentiality of review organization's records
The proceedings and records of a review committee shall be held in
confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence
in any civil action against a professional health care provider arising out of
the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee
and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall
be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence
or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such
committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions or
other actions of such committee or any members thereof: Provided, however,
that information, documents or records otherwise available from original
sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in any such
civil action merely because they were presented during proceedings of such
committee, nor should any person who testifies before such committee or who
is a member of such committee be prevented from testifying as to matters
within his knowledge, but the said witness cannot be asked about his testimony
before such a committee or opinions formed by him as a result of said
committee hearings.
Id.
11. Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy,
10 AM. J. L. MED. 151 (Summer 1984), reprinted in, L.S. Goldsmith, Hospital
Liability: Law and Practice 163 (1987).
12. Pa. H.B. 2067 (1978).
13. Commonwealth of Pa., Combined History of Senate and House Bills,
H.B. 1729 at A-237 (1974).
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1978.14 The PPRPA's definition section 5 codifies the meaning of
14. Commonwealth of Pa., Combined History of Senate and House Bills,
H.B. 2067 at A-269 (1978).
15. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.2 (Purdon 1986), provides in pertinent
part:
As used in this act:
"Peer review" means the procedure for evaluation by professional health care
providers of the quality and efficiency of services ordered or performed by
other professional health care providers, including practice analysis, inpatient
hospital and extended care facility utilization review, medical audit, ambulatory
care review, claims review, and the compliance of a hospital, nursing- home
or convalescent home or other health care facility operated by a professional
health care provider with the standards set by an association of health care
providers and with applicable laws, rules and regulations.
"Professional health care provider" means individuals or organizations who
are approved, licensed or otherwise regulated to practice or operate in the









(8) A registered or practical nurse.
(9) A physical therapist.
(10) An administrator of a hospital, a nursing or convalescent home, or other
health care facility.
(11) A corporation or other organization operating a hospital, a nursing or
convalescent home or other health care facility.
"Professional society" includes medical, psychological, nursing, dental, op-
tometric, pharmaceutical, chiropractic and podiatric organizations having as
members at least a majority of the eligible licentiates in the area or health
care facility or agency served by the particular society.
"Review organization" means any committee engaging in peer review, includ-
ing a hospital utilization review committee, a hospital tissue committee, a
health insurance review committee, a hospital plan corporation review com-
mittee, a professional health service plan review committee, a dental review
committee, a physicians' advisory committee, a nursing advisory committee,
any committee established pursuant to the medical assistance program, and
any committee established by one or more State or local professional societies,
to gather and review information relating to the care and treatment of patients
for the purposes of (i) evaluating and improving the quality of health care
rendered; (ii) reducing morbidity or mortality; or (iii) establishing and enforcing
guidelines designed to keep within reasonable bounds the cost of health care.
It shall also mean any hospital board, committee or individual reviewing the
professional qualifications or activities of its medical staff or applications for
1988l
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"peer review." The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the PPRPA in
order to: 1) aid in evaluating and improving the quality of health
care rendered; 2) reduce the morbidity or mortality; and 3) help
establish guidelines to keep costs down.' 6 The PPRPA established
two types of protection: confidentiality of review organization records'
7
and immunity from liability for good faith participation in the peer
review process.' 8 In order to enhance the likelihood of honest and
critical review of medical professionals, with the goal of improved
health care at lower costs, the legislature made a policy decision to
allow physicians to review their own professional conduct without
outside interference. 9
A. Immunity
The immunity provision of PPRPA, section 425.3, provides a
general civil and criminal immunity to those persons "providing
information to any review organization. ' 20 The individual is granted
this protection unless such information is unrelated to the function
admission thereto. It shall also mean a committee of an association of
professional health care providers reviewing the operation of hospitals, nursing
homes, convalescent homes or other health care facilities.
Id.
16. Id. See supra note 15 for definition of "review organization" for this
policy statement.
17. 63 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 425.4 (Purdon 1986), see supra note 10 for
the pertinent language of the Act.
18. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.3 (Purdon 1986), provides:
Immunity from liability
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person providing infor-
mation to any review organization shall be held, by reason of having provided
such information, to have violated any criminal law, or to be civilly liable
under any law unless:
(1) such information is unrelated to the performance of the duties and functions
of such review organization, or
(2) such information is false and the person providing such information knew,
or had reason to believe, that such information was false.
(b)(l) No individual who, as a member or employee of any review organization
or who furnishes professional counsel or services to such organization, shall
be held by reason of the performance by him of any duty, function, or activity
authorized or required of review organizations, to have violated any criminal
law, or to be civilly liable under any law, provided he has exercised due care.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply with
respect to any action taken by any individual if such individual, in taking
such action, was motivated by malice toward any person affected by such
action.
Id.
19. See Peer Review Protection supra note 7.
20. See 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.3, supra note 18.
956 [Vol. 26:953
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of the review committee or the information was in fact false and the
provider knew, or should have known, that the information was
false.2 The immunity provision also applies to members or employees
22
of review organizations acting in furtherance of the organization's
activities. As long as the members act with due care and without
malice,23 their action is immune from criminal or civil prosecution. 2
4
B. Confidentiality
Section 425.4 of the PPRPA addresses the requirement of confi-
dentiality of the review organization's records.2 5 This section man-
dates the "proceedings and records of a review ... shall not be
subject to discovery." ' 26 This section also provides that "no person
who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be
permitted or required to testify" concerning matters properly brought
before the committee. 27 However, there is an exception to the general
rule set forth in this section. Information "otherwise available from
the original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery
... merely because they were presented" before the committee. 21
This section attempts to balance the need for confidentiality in order
to promote frank review with the need for those individuals wronged
to reach relevant information in support of their case. The legislature
reached this delicate balance by allowing plaintiffs continued access
to information that can be obtained from original sources or from
those individuals with first hand knowledge of the event. The Penn-
sylvania courts have found it difficult to implement this discrete
balancing scheme and until recently, therewas much confusion in
the judicial interpretation of the Act.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT
There has not been a flood of litigation reported involving inter-
pretation of the PPRPA. This however, as any medical malpractice
21. Id. at § 425.3(a)(2), supra note 18.
22. Id. at § 425.3(b)(1), supra note 18.
23. Id. at § 425.3(b)(1) & (2), supra note 18.
24. Id. at § 425.3, supra note 18. For an in-depth discussion of the immunity
provisions of the PPRPA see Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the
Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L. Q. 552, 579 (1979).
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litigator would assert, does not belittle the importance of the Act.
Most of the confrontations concerning the PPRPA arise in front of
motion judges and unfortunately few of these arguments are reported.
An unlimited number of other confrontations are avoided for fear
of contempt charges 29 or sanctions. 0 A recent Pennsylvania Superior
Court case decision should, however, help clarify the law in this
area.
A. Cases Allowing Discovery
There are three judicial interpretations of the PPRPA that have
allowed discovery of peer review documents and/or records. The
most noteworthy of these cases is Fowler v. Pirris.3' The Fowler case
concerned a medical malpractice claim that arose after a woman died
as a result of complications suffered during and then after child-
birth.12 The plaintiff, by the way of a motion for production, sought
a number of documents relating to the professional expertise of Dr.
Pirris.33 The Washington Hospital requested a protective order pur-
suant to section 425.4 of the PPRPA.14 The court relied upon the
"obtainable from original sources"35 exception stating that the plain-
tiff shall be able to discover such information as he could obtain it
from the original source, the JCAH.36 The court, Judge Bell presid-
ing, did not limit its invasion to the JCAH reports. The court allowed
the discovery of Dr. Pirris' application for staff privileges; documents
29. Pa. R.C.P. 1910.13 which provides:
Disobedience of Order of Court
If a person disobeys an order of court other than a support order, the
court may issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the person and if the
disobedience is wilful may, after hearing, adjudge the person to be in contempt.
Id.
30. Pa. R.P.C.P. 4019 which provides in relevant part:
Sanctions
(a)(1) The court may, on motion, make an appropriate order if
(i) a party fails to serve answers, sufficient answers or objections to written
interrogatories...
(viii) a party or person otherwise fails to make discovery or to obey an order
of the court respecting discovery.
Id.
31. 34 Pa. D. & C.3d 530 (1981).
32. Id. at 532.
33. Id.
34. Id. See supra note 10 for the language of § 425.4.
35. Fowler, 34 Pa. D. & C.3d at 532. See supra note 10 for relevant statutory
language.
36. Fowler, 34 Pa. D. & C.3d at 533.
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in the possession of the hospital concerning an investigation into Dr.
Pirris' qualifications; and any document showing how the medical
staff standards applied to Dr. Pirris.3 7 This opinion renders the
confidentiality provisions of the PPRPA meaningless.38
In Bolton v. Holy Spirit Hospital,3 9 the hospital objected to the
plaintiff's request for documents so far as this production concerned
prior complaints, corrective action, supervision and information con-
tained in personnel files.4 The court focused its attention on the
"arising out of the matters which are subject of evaluation and
review" language of section 425.4.41 The court emasculated the
protections afforded under the PPRPA by allowing discovery of
,personnel files, notes of committee members that did not arise
"solely" from peer review, other patient complaints, and peer review
records concerning patients other than the plaintiff.4 2
In Trent v. Lancaster General Hospital,3 an action was brought
against a hospital for negligent care and treatment, failure to obtain
informed consent, and failure to disclose all pertinent dangers in-
volved in the procedure." The plaintiff had lost an eye as the result
of a post operative infection.4 5 Counsel for the plaintiff was allowed
access to the infection control policy records despite the fact that
37. Id. at 534.
38. The court stated:
It [PPRPA] was not meant to insulate a hospital group from liability if that
group in their negligent review of staff applications permitted one not fully
qualified to administer expert medical services. As the documents requested
in 3(C) [investigation of qualifications] also do not deal with the particular
circumstances from which the civil action arises, we will permit discovery.
Fowler, at 537.
It is important to realize that the action against the hospital was for negligence
in permitting unqualified medical practitioners to render services to the plaintiff.
Id. at 532. It is not at all clear how the court concluded that the requested
documentation did "not deal with the particular circumstances from which the civil
action arises." Id.
39. 105 Dauph. 40 (Pa. C. 1984).
40. Id. at 41.
41. Id. at 42. The court stated that the legislature did not intend to grant an
absolute privilege. The legislature intended to balance the plaintiff's right to infor-
mation with the need for confidentiality of peer review records. However, once the
court cited Pa. R.C.P. 126 and discussed the policy of broad discovery in Pennsyl-
vania, it had reached its determination to allow discovery. Bolton, supra note 39,
at 45.
42. Id. at 48.
43. 70 LANCASTER L. REV. 170 (Pa. C. 1986).
44. Id. at 171.
45. Id.
19881
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the information was part of the hospital's internal review mecha-
nism.46 The Trent court, without much discussion, held that the
requested information "in no way concerns plaintiff's specific case"
and fell within the 425.4 exception.
4 1
B. Cases Upholding Confidentiality
There have been a number of cases supporting the protections
offered by the PPRPA. Many of these opinions have given an overly
strict, confined and confused interpretation of the PPRPA. For the
most part, the opinions in this section, as in the preceding section,
do not adequately apply the Act.
Pennsylvania courts first interpretated the PPRPA in Schwartz v.
Tri-County Hospital.48 The plaintiff in Schwartz brought a wrongful
death and survival action against two physicians and a hospital.4 9 A
supplemental set of interrogatories were imposed upon all three
defendants requesting information concerning appearances before
medical committees and review groups in reference to the treatment
of the decedent.5 0 The court held that this information could not be
reached as it would interfere with the open and frank discussion of
reviewing authorities."
In Holliday v. Klimosky1 2 a malpractice action was brought claim-
ing incompetent surgery by a member of the hospital surgical staff. 3
The plaintiff requested discovery of internal hospital records and the
hospital moved for a protective order. 4 The plaintiff's request was
filed prior to the passage of the PPRPA and the court relied upon
pre-PPRPA case law in reaching its determination. 5 Except for the
46. Id. at 171-72.
47. Id. at 173.
48. 74 Pa. D. & C.2d 52 (1975).
49. Id. at 53.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 408 (1976).
53. Id. at 409.
54. Id.
55. Id. See Petrusky v. Charleroi Monessen Hospital, No. 367 (Pa. C.P.
Washington Co. 1974). Petrusky stated:
We are going to allow the discovery because to refuse it would be to tell the
Plaintiff that he may not even try to prove that the hospital staff, including
the defendant dentists, engaged in either an actually deceitful, a merely willful,
or an inexplicably negligent review of the case. It may turn out that some of
the matters are too privileged within the processes of the hospital and organized
medicine itself to wave around in the courtroom. They do not however seem
to us to be too privileged to be inquired into at private deposition, the record
of which we can always seal, if it becomes necessary.
Id., slip opinion at 3 (emphasis omitted).
960 [Vol. 26:953
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW PROTECTION
records held by the Utilization Review Committee, the discovery
request was granted.56 The court concluded that the records held by
the Utilization Review Committee were specifically protected from
discovery by section 425.4 of the newly enacted PPRPA.17 This court
actually misconstrued the PPRPA58 as it allowed discovery of infor-
mation concerning: 1) Dr. Klimoski's review by the medical staff
and the Board of Trustees and, 2) charges filed against the physician
by members of the hospital staff.5 9 The Holliday court put unwar-
ranted importance on the nomenclature involved in review rather
than on the function of the "review organization". 6°
In Bandes v. Klimowski,61 the professional abilities of Dr. Kli-
mowski (A/K/A Dr.Klimoski) 62 were again at issue in a medical
malpractice action. The plaintiff, at deposition, attempted to ascertain
whether or not Dr. Klimowski had broken any hospital rules besides
the late filing of records. 63 The court ruled that this question need
not be answered because it related to information that the PPRPA
was designed to protect from discovery. 64 This conclusion is correct
only if the answer to the inquiry would disclose records or proceedings
of a review organization. This is an important point that was not
addressed in the opinion.
In Obenski v. Brooks,65 a motion to compel discovery was brought
in a medical malpractice action. 66 The court began its inquiry by
stating that the general rule in Pennsylvania is that "discovery shall
56. Holliday, supra note 52, at 411.
57. Id.
58. Such a misconstrued reading of the PPRPA was, although not directly
cited, probably based on the opinion in Bolton. See supra notes 39-42 and accom-
panying text.
59. Holliday, supra note 52, at 410.
60. Id. The reason this case is discussed under this heading and not under
cases allowing discovery is that this court, even though it gave a much too restrictive
reading of the PPRPA, protected the information and records of the Utilization
Review Committee. Id. See supra note 15 for the definition of "review organization"
which includes utilization review.
61. 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 11 (C.P. Fayette Co. 1977).
62. See Holliday supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
63. Bandes, 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 11, 15-16 (1978). The precise question at
deposition was: "Has there ever been any infraction of the rules concerning Dr.
Klimowski other than the late reporting of hospital records? Id.
64. Bandes, supra note 63, at 16. The court made specific reference to §
425.4 in reaching this conclusion. See supra note 10 for the relevant portion of the
Act.
65. 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 253 (1978).
66. Id. at 255.
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be liberally permitted. ' 67 The court noted that the defendant/physi-
cian was the only practical source of the requested information and
if such inquiry was prohibited, it would probably foreclose the
plaintiff's investigation into the subject. 6 The court allowed discovery
of information relating to the physician's applications to professional
societies and, the physician's own inquiries into gaining hospital
privileges. 69 The court however, affirmatively stated that "discovery
in this area must, . . . exclude inquiries into areas that are immune
from discovery by virtue of the Peer Review Protection Act." ' 70 The
court did not state with any specificity what documents or infor-
mation were to be protected by the Act.
In January of 1987, Judge Wettick of the Allegheny County Court,
authored an opinion interpreting the PPRPA. In O'Neill v. Mc-
Keesport Hospital,7' the plaintiff alleged that the hospital was neg-
ligent in its administration of anesthesia and in failing to diagnose
O'Neill's condition. 72 The plaintiff requested production of docu-
ments, reports, or recommendations issued by the JCAH dealing
with the anesthesia and surgery procedures of McKeesport Hospital. 73
Initially, the court had to determine if the JCAH records were
"records of a review committee" within the meaning of 425.2. The
court held that the purpose of the JCAH was to evaluate the quality
and efficiency of the services of the hospital.7 4 The O'Neill court
67. Id. at 256. The court cited Pa. R.C.P. 126 and 4007 for this proposition.
Rule 4007 was rescinded Nov. 28, 1978, however, the subject matter of former rule
4007 has been transferred to rules 4001(c), 4003.1, 4007.1 and 4007.2.
68. Obenski, supra note 65, at 265. The plaintiff sought to discover infor-
mation relating to the defendant/physician's application for hospital staff privileges.
Id. at 262.
69. Obenski, supra note 65, at 265.
70. Id. at 264.
71. 135 P.L.J. 217 (1987).
72. Id. at 217. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that McKeesport Hospital
was negligent in the following respects:
(1) failure to adopt rules, regulations, and procedures for the safe administra-
tion of anesthesia;
(2) failure to require hospital employees to monitor the patient's body tem-
perature during surgery;
(3) failure to comply with JCAH policy; and
(4) failure to recognize and diagnose O'Neill's condition.
Id.
73. O'Neill, at 217.
74. Id. at 219. The court relied upon the JCAH Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals, (1983 ed.) which states that the purpose of the certificate of incorporation
is:
1. [T]o establish standards for the operation of hospitals and other health-
[Vol. 26:953
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openly disagreed with the Washington County opinion in Fowler v.
Pirris.75 Judge Wettick analyzed the goals and objectives of PPRPA
and concluded that the Act protected from discovery any peer review
materials of a medical care provider in any lawsuit against that
provider.76
In late March of 1987, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania filed
an opinion interpreting the PPRPA. In Sanderson v. Bryan,77 the
medical malpractice plaintiff filed a request for production of doc-
uments from the defendant Carlisle Hospital. 7 The plaintiff requested
documents and recordings maintained by a peer review organization
involving an evaluation of the defendant/physician. 9 The lower court
had not protected this information to the extent requested by the
defending pa'ties.80 The superior court granted appeal in this case
because of the importance of the issue involved and because of the
conflicting lower court opinions interpreting the PPRPA.81
The court began its analysis of the PPRPA by stating that hospital
peer review records are generally protected from public scrutiny by
either legislation or judicial decision.8 2 The court's research uncovered
at least forty-six states that had enacted legislation concerning peer
review.83 The privilege in Pennsylvania was not intended to be ab-
related facilities and services;
2. to conduct survey and accreditation programs that will encourage members
of the health professions, hospitals, and other health-related facilities and
services voluntary:
a. to promote high quality of care in all aspects in order to give patients
the optimum benefits that medical science has to offer,
b. to apply certain basic principles of physical plant safety and maintenance,
and of organization and administration of function for efficient care of the
patient, and
c. to maintain the essential services in the facilities through coordinated
effort of the organized staffs and the governing bodies of the facilities; [and]
3. to recognize compliance with standards by issuance of certificates of
accreditation.
JCAH Manual, at ix.
75. O'Neill, supra note 71, at 219. For a discussion of Fowler v. Pirris, see
supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
76. O'Neill, supra note 71, at 220.
77. 361 Pa. Super. 491, 522 A.2d 1138 (1987).
78. Id. at 493, 522 A.2d at 1139.
79. Id.
80. See 33 Cumberland L.J. 443 (Pa. C. 1983).
81. Sanderson, supra note 77, 361 Pa. Super. at 492, 522 A.2d at 1138.
82. Id. at 494, 522 A.2d at 1139.
83. The court relied upon, Note, The Missouri Rule: Hospital Peer Review
is Discoverable in Medical Malpractice Cases, 50 Mo. L.REv. 459 (1985), and listed
19881
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solute, because if it was, the legislature would have simply stated it
as an absolute.8 4 The court did, however, hold that the Act protected
the information sought in this case. 85 However, this protection did
not result in a summary judgment for the defendant because the
plaintiff still had access to his own records and he could depose of
those with first hand knowledge of the factual circumstances . 6 In its
final analysis the court explained that the plaintiff was also able to
employ his own expert to give opinions concerning the factual matters
discoverable in the case." It is precisely in this fashion that the goals
of the legislature and the rights of the injured are properly balanced.
C. Conclusion on Pennsylvania Case Law
To say that the Pennsylvania case law in the area of peer review
is confused would be an understatement. The practical effect of this
the statutory enactments as follows:
ALA. CODE § 22-21-8-(b) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (1981); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (Supp. 1975-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-934 (1979);
CAL. EVID. Doc § 1157 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
110(l) (1973) & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-25 (West Supp.
1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1768 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40(4)
(West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1908 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV.
STAT. 624-25.5 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 39-1392b (1977 & 1984 Supp.);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 8-2101 (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-4-3-1 (Burns
1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.42 (West 1972); 1984 KAN. SESS. LAWS ch. 238
§ 7(c); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.377(2) (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 13 § 3715.3
(West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2510(3) (1964); MD. HEALTH
Occ. CODE ANN. § 14-601(d) (1981 & Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2632 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.64 (West Supp. 1984); Miss.
CODE. ANN. § 41-63-9 (1972 & Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.035.4
(Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-203, 50-16-205 (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265 (1981); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 151:13-a (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.8 (West
Supp. 1984-85); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5 (1982 Supp. Pamphlet); N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 405.24(k) (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (Supp.
1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.251 (Page 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-709 (West 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 41.675 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 (Purdon Supp.
1984-85); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 36-4-26.1 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 4447d § 3 (Vernon 1973); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1958-1960 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 8:01-581.17 (1984);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.250 (Supp. 1963-1985); W. VA. CODE § 30-
3C-3 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West Supp. 1975-1984); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-2-602 (1977).
Sanderson, supra note 77, at 495, 522 A.2d at 1140.
84. Id. at 498, 522 A.2d at 1141.
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is that review is not as frank and effective because of the threat of
disclosure in any impending litigation. The Sanderson opinion has
tried to clear up much of the confusion concerning the PPRPA.
Many courts and practitioners have found it difficult to reconcile the
Act with the broad discovery rules. The fact remains that the Act
does not protect physicians from responsibility for the injuries that
they inflict upon the innocent. The PPRPA merely protects the
review committees and organizations that perpetuate the health care
self-evaluation process. The plaintiff is neither foreclosed from reach-
ing his/her own medical records nor from those individuals with first
hand knowledge of pertinent events. The review committee process
and its records should not be discoverable because review is to be
professionally critical, even in cases in which there is no injury. If
there is an actual injury coupled with the requisite degree of fault,
the plaintiff can use a qualified expert to advance this line of thought.
The court in Sanderson realized this, and that opinion offers a good
path for future decisions interpreting the PPRPA to follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been estimated that five percent of all practicing physicians
are unfit for practice, because they are mentally ill, addicted to drugs,
or ignorant of modern medical techniques . 8 Over thirty thousand
Americans die annually from faulty prescriptions alone, and ten times
that amount suffer dangerous side effects.8 9 Incompetent and unnec-
essary surgery are also serious problems that seem to be growing. 90
These facts, coupled with the fact that many patients suffer from
the Lazarus Syndrome, 91 give rise to an ever increasing amount of
malpractice litigation. Therefore, a uniform interpretation of the
Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act is necessary in order to
gain predictability of result in the court room and give sanctity to
internal hospital peer review proceedings.
Those that argue for disclosure of all information, records, and
review committee notes, state that disclosure is the only way to
88. A.L. Strauss, Where Medicine Fails, 4th edition (1984); Medicine &
Malpractice, by David Makofsky, 385.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The Lazarus Syndrome is a psychological condition in which the patient
feels that the physician, being God-like, will be able to cure any ailment. This term
is derived from the Biblical character Lazarus, brother of Mary and Martha of
Bethany who, after four days in the tomb, was brought back to life by Jesus. John
11. 1-44; 12.1,2.
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remedy the rights of the individuals that have been injured. They
allege that self-regulation has failed and inept physicians use peer
review protection in perpetuation of their professional conspiracy of
silence. 92 There are cases in which such an evaluation is in fact true.
The most grotesque example of the failures of peer review were made
apparent in Miofsky v. Superior Court.93 The physician in the Miof-
sky case committed over eighty acts of sexual misconduct upon
patients, during surgery, and remained fully licensed because "profes-
sionals do not publicly speak critically of fellow professionals.
' '94
Such extreme examples of the failure of peer review only feed the
fire under the argument that peer review is a public policy experiment
that has failed. The Pennsylvania Legislature has confidence in the
medical professionals of this Commonwealth. Thus the legislature
has decided to protect and promote the purpose of peer review, that
being the maintenance and continued growth of high professional
standards. The public interest will be best served in the long run by
the preservation of the confidentiality of peer review. Pennsylvania
is trying to promote increased use of peer review95 by offering an
environment in which free, open, frank and critical discussion can
occur. Peer review, in its utopian sense, will lead to a higher quality
of care at lower costs to the consumer. Peer review, is the hope for
the future. It can only be effective if its mission is taken seriously
by those at all levels of medical care.
96
The Sanderson opinion has helped in overcoming some of the
confusion in the courts and in the review committees concerning
PPRPA. In the long term, the PPRPA will help lead to a higher
quality of care, at lower cost, for all Pennsylvania residents.
Christopher R.M. Richmond
92. See supra note 11.
93. 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. See supra note 11. Dr. Miofsky was ranked first on a list of The 10
Most Bizarre Sex Crimes of the 20th Century, Penthouse, May 1982. The Physician,
an anesthesiologist, allegedly placed his penis in the mouths of over eighty female
patients during surgery.
95. H.B. 1729, Act of July 20, 1974, P.L. 564, No. 193.
96. J. Greenspan, Accountability and Quality Assurance in Health Care. The
Charles Press Publishers (1980), 201. Jack Greenspan, M.D., is the Director of the
Quality Assurance Program of the Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital.
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